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Abstract 
This study is conducted with the main objective of analyzing the empirical relationship between tax compliance 
behaviour and its determinants in South Gonder Zone of the Amhara region. The study is conducted by using 
primary data collected from category “A” and “B” tax payers. The primary data is collected using structured 
questionnaire from 11 districts in the zone. The response obtained from 295 respondents (87.3% response rate) is 
used for the analysis. Both descriptive and econometrics approach is applied to analyze the data. In order to 
determine the empirical relationship between tax compliance behavior and its determinant, binary logit model is 
estimated. The study found that audit rate, attitude of tax payers, perception on equity of the tax system and benefit 
from the government as well as education are found to have statistically significant positive impact on the tax 
compliance behavior of category” A” and “B” tax payers in South Goder Zone. On the contrary, tax rate, audit 
probability, social norm, compliance cost and sex are identified as statistically significant negative determinants 
of tax compliance behavior in the study area. But, Penalty rate, Perception of government Spending, training to 
enhance tax knowledge and age of the respondent are found to have statistically insignificant effects on compliance 
behavior of category “A” and “B” tax payers in South Gondar zone. Finally, the study has forwarded suggestions 
to further strengthen audit rates, tax equity, tax education, and build the capacity of tax auditors. Moreover, the tax 
authority should work hard to reduce compliance costs and improve the attitudes of tax payers.  
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1. Introduction 
Tax compliance is defined as the accurate reporting of income and claiming of expenses in accordance with the 
stipulated tax laws (Noor and Jeyapalan, 2013).  According to Palil and Mustapha (2011) tax compliance can also 
be defined as taxpayers’ ability and willingness to comply with tax laws which are determined by ethics, legal 
environment and other situational factors at a particular time and place. Similarly, tax compliance is also defined 
as the ability and willingness of taxpayers to comply with tax laws, declare the correct income and pays the right 
amount of taxes on time. Palil and Mustapha (2011) stated that tax compliance requires a degree of honesty, 
adequate tax knowledge and capability to use this knowledge, accuracy and adequate records in order to complete 
the tax returns and associated tax documentation. 
Hence, the goal of tax administration is to develop voluntary tax compliance, although tax noncompliance is 
an issue aggravates both developed and developing countries and becomes a growing global problem (McKerchar 
and Evans, 2009). Moreover, many of the available literature indications suggested that developing countries, 
particularly Sub‐Saharan Africa countries are the hardest hit. Tax non-compliance is a problem that affects tax 
administration and tax revenue performance. In Ethiopia, the total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP has 
continued to decline and has accounted for 12.5 percent in 2014/15 to 12.5 percent in 2015/16 and 11.8 percent in 
2016/17 (International monetary fund,2018). This is an indication of non compliant of tax. Reducing the loss of 
revenues resulting from non-compliance with tax laws is critical to achieve fiscal objectives. Therefore, identifying 
the sources of noncompliance is critical to designing and implementing an effective and targeted remediation for 
the country.  
Empirical studies on the factors that affect tax compliance in Ethiopia are very scanty. To the best of the 
researchers’ Knowledge Tehulu & Dinberu (2014), Tesafa et al (2015), and Ahmed & Kedir (2015) have made an 
effort to identify the most important factors of tax compliance. However, no research have addressed in South 
Gondar Zone that this research was try to address. Moreover, other studies except Tesafa et al (2015) did not 
employ any econometric model that is appropriate for such a study. In this study effort was made to apply an 
appropriate discrete choice econometric model (logit model) to identify the major economic and non-economic 
factors of tax compliance in south Gonder zone. Besides, results of previous researches on the topic indicated that 
for most of the variables that used in this study results are inconclusive. The main objectives of this study were: 
1. To investigate the economic determinants of tax compliance behavior of business profit taxpayers.  
2. To examine the non-economic determinants of tax compliance behavior of business profit taxpayers.  
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2. Literature Review 
Theoretically, there are a number of factors for the compliance and/or non-compliance behavior of tax payers. 
Broadly, the determinants can be divided in to two: economic and non-economic factors. In the following section 
the relationship economic and non-economic factors have with tax compliance behavior are discussed under the 
five categories of theories which are found to be important for the model formulation. 
a) Economic deterrence 
According to Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the tax rate which determines the benefit of evasion and the 
probability of detection and penalties for fraud which determine the costs are factors that could influence the 
behavior of tax payers. This literature has been postulated that the relationship between tax rates and tax 
compliance is directly proportional, that is an increase in the tax rates always leads to an increase in tax compliance 
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). On the other hand, several research findings(Chau and Leung ,2009;Alm et 
al. ,1995; Feinstein ,1991, and Mas'ud, Aliyu, and Gambo ,2014) have  revealed a negative relationship between 
tax rates and tax compliance. More evidence revealed a high tax rate to be positively related to tax evasion as well 
as negatively related to tax compliance (Ali, Cecil, & Knoblett, 2001; Christian & Gupta, 1993). 
 The other implication of this theory is that few people will evade tax if the probability of detection is high 
and penalties are severe. However, the expected return to evasion is high if the probability of audit is low and 
penalties are also low. Under such situations, substantial noncompliance will occur. The relevance of deterrence 
strategies to address noncompliance behavior has been confirmed by research out puts (McKerchar and Evans 
2009). Fear of getting caught, or the probability of detection, has been found in some contexts to be an effective 
strategy to induce truthful behavior. Hence, economic deterrence theory is one of the widely accepted theories in 
tax administrations when developing enforcement strategies that rely principally on penalties and the fear of getting 
caught. However, a critic on the theory has also been forwarded on its exclusive emphasis on the coercive side of 
compliance at the expense of the consensual (Sandmo, 2005).    
b) Fiscal exchange 
This theory asserts that a government which could provide public goods which citizens prefer in an efficient and 
accessible manner would motivate tax payers to comply their tax (Cowell and Gordon 1988; Levi 1988; Tilly 
1992). According to Alm et al. (1992) tax compliance would increase with an increased perception of the 
availability to public goods and services. The implication of this theory is that tax payers are highly concerned 
about the direct return they could derive from public services as a result of paying tax. Moore (2004) also explained 
that in terms of taxation and the provision of public goods and services, taxpayers and the government do have a 
contractual relationship. Hence, a tax payer is convinced as he/she is benefiting from the supply of goods by the 
government means the individual may pay more taxes recognizing that their payments are necessary both to help 
finance the goods and services and to get others to contribute.  
One problem with this theory is that most taxpayers cannot assess the exact value of what they receive from 
the government in return for taxes paid. However, it can be argued that they have general impressions and attitudes 
concerning their own and others’ terms of trade with the government(Richupan,1987).Thus, assuming taxpayer’s 
behavior is affected by his/her satisfaction or lack of satisfaction from the exchange is reasonable. Tax evasion 
may, at least partly, a rise as an attempt to adjust their terms of trade with the government if tax payers perceive 
the tax system is unjust. Although this theory has a well established theoretical base, empirical evidences 
conducted so far to support the theory do have ambiguous nature (D'Arcy, 2011). 
c) Social influences 
According to Snavely (1990), like any other forms of behavior, it is reasonable to assume human behavior in the 
area of taxation is much influenced by social interactions. The central idea of this model is that compliance 
behavior and attitudes towards the tax system is thought to be affected by the behavior and social norms of an 
individual’s reference group. In other words, the behavior of an individual’s reference group such as relatives, 
neighbors and friends do have a greater effect on compliance/non-compliance behavior and attitudes towards the 
tax system. The social influence theory tells that if a taxpayer knows many people in groups important to him who 
evades taxes, the individual’s commitment to comply will significantly decrease. On the other hand, if a tax payer 
develops fear of social sanctions following detection and publicity it will deter the individual from engaging in 
evasion.  
The effect of social influence on the compliance behavior of tax payers was also confirmed by different 
theoretical researches.  Banerjee (1992) in his theoretical research on group behavior in economic situations have 
indicated that social influences may affect compliance, in particular by affecting the perceived probability of 
detection. According to Yankelovich et al. (1984), one of the most consistent findings about taxpayer attitudes and 
behavior in Western countries is that those who report compliance believe that their peers and friends (and 
taxpayers in general) comply, whereas those who report cheating believe that others cheat. Evidence suggests that 
perceptions about the honesty of others may affect compliance behavior. 
d) Comparative treatment 
This theory indicated that the tax payers’ perception on equity has effect on their compliance behavior. According 
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to McKerchar and Evans (2009), addressing inequities in the exchange relationship between government and 
taxpayers would result in improved compliance. Citizens may not consider their relationship with the state in a 
vacuum where both parties are the only actors. Likewise, they may not think about their fellow citizens without 
considering their own relationship with the state. They may also consider how the state treats them relative to their 
fellow citizens. This judgment is likely to affect not only their judgment of the state, but also how they view their 
fellow citizens (D'Arcy, 2011). If the state treats certain groups preferentially, this may color the citizen’s 
relationship with the state and the group receiving favors. A crucial variable is then not just what a person gets 
from the state, but what the person gets from the state (and how the state treats the person) relative to those who 
are in the person’s wider national community. This social psychology model highlights the importance of equity 
theory in the study of compliance and taxpayer behavior. 
e) Political legitimacy 
Tayler (2006) and Kirchler et al (2008) have explained the political legitimacy theory and its effect on tax 
compliance. According to them tax compliance is influenced by the extent that citizens trust their government. 
Citizens’ belief or trust on the authorities, institutions, and social arrangements to be appropriate, proper, just and 
work for the common good refers the legitimacy of that political situation. Political scientists have addressed how 
political legitimacy and civic identification are fostered. A study conducted by Persson(2008) showed that the 
more successful  African countries upon independence are those which build national over ethnic identity than 
those which allowed ethnicity to become the main animus of politics. 
f) Audit Rates 
According to Nicoleta( 2011),tax audit is one of the most effective policies to protect the behavior of tax evasion .In 
Self Assessment System, one of the legally provided powers for the tax authority is to review the tax declaration 
filed by the taxpayer within a specific period of time. Tax education is among the objectives pursued by tax audit, 
whereby the tax administration shows to the taxpayer the articles of the law violated leading to re-assessment of 
additional tax. In its report, the tax administration advises the taxpayer on the way forward to avoid future mistakes 
in his books of accounts. It is against this background that Kirchler (2007) confirmed that high audit rates had a 
significant impact on compliance rates. Despite the existence of studies which have confirmed the positive 
correlation between compliance and tax audit rate, Mohd (2010) on the other hand revealed that tax audit rate was 
not significant to influence the compliance behavior.  
g) Compliance Costs 
Compliance cost is expenditure of money in conforming to government requirements such as legislation or 
regulation. Compliance costs normally include all costs associated with obeying the law, including planning and 
administration, in addition to the direct time and money spent filing paperwork. Sandford (1981), an excessive 
compliance costs would make taxpayers to choose evading tax in order to compensate the cost they could incur. 
h) Attitudes towards taxes 
Attitude represents the positive or negative evaluation that an individual holds of objects (Nicoletta, 2011). 
Taxpayers with positive attitude towards tax evasion will tend to be less complaint, whereas taxpayers with 
negative attitude towards tax evasion will be more compliant. 
 
3.  Research Design and Methodology 
3.1 Research Design  
This study applied diagnostic research design approach, aiming to investigate the relationship among variables 
(Adams et.al, 2007). Information is collected from respondents on different variables (economic and non-economic) 
and logit model is applied to establish statistical relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
 
3.2  Study Area, Population and Sampling Procedure 
The study is conducted in south Gonder Zone. South Gonder Zone is found in Amhara Regional state, Ethiopia 
which is 625.04km away from Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia. In this Zone there are 11 districts: Farta, 
Fogera, Estie, Simada, Tachgaint, Laygaint, Dera, Debre Tabor, Libokemkem, Ebnat, Andabet and 4 Town 
Administrations: Nefasmewuch, Addis zemen, woreta and Mekane Eyesus.  
The population of this study is 2171 registered category A and B taxpayers found in the 11 districts and 4 
town administrations of South Gonder Zone. This study used stratified random sampling technique. 11 strata  are  
formed by merging the 4 town administrations to the nearby districts(i.e, Nefeas Mewcha with Lay Gayent,Addis 
Zemene with Libo kemekem,Woreta with Fogera and Mekane Eyesus with Estie)   and random sampling technique 
is applied to select respondents from each strata. Finally, the sample required from each stratum is determined 
through simple probability proportionate to size approach. 
i.e.;        N
Nn
n ii
*

 
Where; ni = proportionate sample size for the ith district under each catagory,n= determined sample size,Ni= 
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portion of the population in the ith district for each category and N= total population for each category.  
The samples required from each district in proportion to the total population are determined as follows. 
District  Total Category A Tax 
payers 
Proportionate 
Share 
Total Category B Tax 
payers 
Proportionate 
Share  
Farta  26 4 94 15 
D/Tabor 266 41 268 42 
Simada 58 9 61 9 
Fogera 87 14 278 43 
Libokemek
em 
62 10 146 23 
Estie 63 10 243 38 
Tach 
Gayent 
35 5 17 3 
Ebenat 53 8 30 4 
Lay 
Gayenet 
103 16 109 17 
Andabet 13 2 49 8 
Dera 13 2 97 15 
Total 779        121 1392 217 
Source: South Gonder Zone Revenue Office Base Line Data, 2017 
 
3.3  Sample Size Determination 
The sample size is determined using the formula developed by Yamane (1967) obtained from Adams et.al (2007). 
The formula is:                          
                         
21 Ne
N
n


 
Where; n = sample size N = Total population e = Error tolerance. 
By taking the 5% margin of error, the sample size is calculated as below: 
                      
2)05.0(21711
2171

n
= 338 
 
3.4  Instrument 
This study used primary data using structured questionnaire to collect all the required information related to tax 
compliance and its determinants from category A and B registered taxpayers. In the questionnaire an indirectly 
phrased questions are used to capture tax compliance behavior of individuals so as to avoid direct implication of 
“wrong doing” by the respondent.  
 
3.5 Model specification 
In order to examine the factors that affect the probability of being compliant, a binary logit model is estimated. 
The probability of being compliant is defined as: 
 ),/1( iiii YXTaxcompEP ii YX 321    
 Where; 
- Pi represents the probability of the ith taxpayer being compliant. Because TAXCOMP is a dummy variable, 
a value of 1 will be given if the ith taxpayer has complaint attitude and a value of 0 for non‐compliant 
attitude. 
-   Xi is a vector for individual level characteristics that affect tax compliance behavior which includes age, 
sex and education.  
-  Yi is a vector for economic and non-economic factors that affect tax compliance behavior.  
- i

’s   are the respective coefficients. 
The study finally estimated the following logit model: 
                                                               
ii
i
i YX
P
P
321)
1
ln(  

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Where 
)
1
ln(
i
i
P
P

 is the natural log of the odds in favor of compliant behavior and 2

and  3

  are the measure 
of change in the log of the odds ratio. 
  
Variable Name, description and Measurement 
Variable 
Name 
Description                         Measurement 
                                                                    Dependent Variable 
Comp  Tax compliance behavior 
tax payer 
Comp=1 if the ith tax payer exhibits compliance behavior and 0 
otherwise 
Independent Variables 
Sex  Sex of the tax payer Sex=1 if the respondent is male and 0 otherwise 
adur audit rate  adur=1if not being audited for successive years pushed the  person 
to non-compliance and 0 otherwise 
aup audit probability aup=1 if high probability of non-detection in tax auditing lead him 
to non-compliance behavior and 0 otherwise 
Pen Penalty rate Pen=1 if  high penalty rate make him/her tax compliant and 0 
otherwise 
Pgov Perception towards the use 
of tax by government 
officials 
Pgov=1 if  the ith  tax payer reported negative perception towards 
the use of  the tax by officials lead him/her   non-compliant 
attu Tax payer attitude for paying 
tax 
attu=1 if  the ith tax payer don't feel guilty when he/she under report 
his/her real income and 0 otherwise 
equ Equitability(fairness) of tax Equ=1 if the ith tax payer reported unfair distribution tax makes 
him/her  non-compliant and 0 otherwise 
eftr Effect of training on tax 
compliance behavior 
eftr=1 if the ith tax payer  reported training provided by the authority 
help him/her to be compliant and 0 otherwise 
Snor Social norm Snor=1 if the ith tax payer reported non-compliance behavior of 
others lead him/her  to be non-compliant and 0 otherwise 
Comc Compliance cost Comc=1 if the ith tax payer reported high cost incurred to pay tax 
make him/her non-compliant and 0 otherwise 
rtr relative tax amount rtr=1 if the  ith tax payer reported the tax imposed on him/her is high 
and 0 otherwise 
tr   tax rate tr=1 if the ith tax payer reported high tax rate lead to non-compliance 
behavior and 0 otherwise 
edu1 Education1 edu1=1 if the  ith tax payer is primary school complete and 0 
otherwise 
edu2 Education2 edu2=1 if the  ith tax payer is Secondary school complete and 0 
otherwise 
edu3 Education3 edu3=1 if the  ith tax payer is college complete and 0 otherwise 
age1 Age group1 age1=1 if the ith tax payer is in the age group between 31-45 and 0 
otherwise 
age2 Age group2 age2=1 if the ith tax payer is in the age group between 46-65 and 0 
otherwise 
age3 Age group3 age3=1 if the ith tax payer is in the age group above 65 and 0 
otherwise 
 
4. Data Analysis 
Data collection is conducted by using 11(eleven) trained enumerators selected from 11(eleven) districts. Structured 
questionnaire is used after translation is made into the local language, Amharic. A total of 338 questionnaires were 
distributed for category A and B tax payers and 295 of them are returned with valid responses. Thus, the response 
rate is approximately 87.3% and analysis of the study is conducted by using data obtained from the 295 respondents.  
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4.1  Descriptive Analysis 
  Number of Respondents   Percentage 
 Male   266 90.17 
Female 29 9.83 
Total 295 100 
Table 4.1: Gender of the study participants 
Source: Own computation from filed survey data,2010 
Table 4.1 shows over 90% of the sampled respondents are male. Thus, female respondents constitute less 
than 10% of our sampled respondents. This evidence imply participation of females in category “A” and “B” tax 
payers is very less and the category is largely represented by male tax payers. As theory supports more tax 
compliance behavior to female tax payers, the share of tax payers with compliance behavior is expected to be less. 
 Number of Respondents Percentage 
Without formal education 18 6.10 
Primary complete 72 24.41 
Secondary complete 150 50.85 
College and above 55 18.64 
Total 295 100 
Table 4.2: Level of education 
Source: Own computation from filed survey data,2010 
Table 4.2 indicates secondary level completed tax payers took the lion share of the respondents followed by 
primary level completes. Category “A”and”B” tax payers without formal education  represents the lowest share of 
the respondents approximately 6% followed by respondents with college and above education level with a share 
of around 18.6%.  
   Number of    
Respondents  
              Percentage 
Age  between 18-30 8 2.71 
Age between 31-45 113 38.31 
Age between 46-64 158 53.56 
Age greater than or equal to 65                16 5.42 
Total               295                               100 
Table 4.3. Age profile of respondents 
Source: Own computation based on filed survey data,2010 
As presented in table 4.3 over 53% of the respondents are in the age category between 46-64 and less than 3% 
of the respondents are between 18-30 implying substantially large share of the respondents is represented by senior 
group of the labor force (between 46-64) followed by the adult group with a share of around 38%. The youth 
represent the lowest share 
 
4.2 Econometric Analysis 
Following theoretical and empirical literatures as a benchmark, the study tried to investigate the role of 
demographic, economic, social and political factors in determining tax compliance behavior in the study area. The 
research chose binary logit model due to the binary nature of the dependent variable. Finally, the logit model result 
is presented in the following table. 
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Comp Coef. Std. Err. Z P>z [95%Conf. Interval] Odds Ratio 
Tr -1.240931 .603029 -2.06 0.040** -2.422846 -.0590158 .2891149 
Adur 1.94685 .7369421 2.64 0.008*** .5024701 3.39123 7.006582 
Aup -3.06838 .6260376 -4.90 0.000*** -4.295391 -1.841369 .0464964 
Pen .8525905 .6746247 1.26 0.206 -.4696495 2.174831 2.345716 
Pgov .7136981 .5354136 1.33 0.183 -.3356932 1.763089 2.041527 
Attu 1.269193 .5493245 2.31 0.021** .1925367 2.345849 3.55798 
Equ 1.668532 .9317251 1.79 0.073* -.1576158 3.494679 5.304374 
Eftr .150674 .6228819 0.24 0.809 -1.070152 1.3715 1.162618 
Snor -1.166701 .6093473 -1.91 0.056* -2.361 .0275974 .3113925 
Comc -3.636403 .6811521 -5.34 0.000*** -4.971437 -2.30137 .0263469 
Sex -2.719091 .8658962 -3.14 0.002*** -4.416217 -1.021966 .0659346 
edu1 1.441812 1.512453 0.95 0.340 -1.522541 4.406164 4.228349 
edu2 2.685473 .822481 3.27 0.001*** 1.07344 4.297506 14.66513 
ed3 2.016783 .8880482 2.27 0.023** .2762406 3.757326 7.514114 
age1 2.585399 1.408425 1.84 0.366 -.1750637 5.345861 13.26858 
age2 .6429345 .5936865 1.08 0.279 -.5206697 1.806539 1.902054 
age3 .4219189 .8551337 0.49 0.622 -1.254112 2.09795 1.524885 
_cons -1.712476 1.556138 -1.10 0.271 -4.76245 1.337498 .1804185 
Number of obs = 295            *** Statistically significant at 1% level of Sig. 
Log likelihood = -55.475872    ** Statistically significant at 5% level of Sig.                    
LR chi2 (17) = 214.65         * Statistically significant at 10% level of Sig. 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 = 0.6592 
Table 4.5.  Coefficient Value, significance level and odds ratio result of the binary Logit model 
In the first step model fitness test is checked. The Likelihood ratio (LR) value in table 4.5 indicates the fitness 
of the specified logit model. The LR value, LR chi2 (17) =214.65[Prob > chi2 =0.0000], is a statistical evidence 
for the presence of good relationship between the dependant variable and combination of independent variables. 
The null hypothesis which states there is no difference between the model without independent variables and the 
model with independent variables is rejected. It, thus, show the binary logit model result with the considered 
independent variables can be used for further interpretation.  
Based on the estimated result audit rate, audit probability, compliance cost, tax rate, attitude, equity and social 
norm are found statistically significant factors for tax compliance behavior. Regarding demographic factors, being 
female or male as well as being found in secondary and college level of education significantly determines the 
probability of compliance behavior. The remaining factors: Penalty rate, perception towards government spending, 
trainings to enhance tax knowledge and age are found to have statistically insignificant effects on the compliance 
behavior of category “A” and “B” tax payers in the study area. 
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Marginal effects after logit 
      y = Pr(comp) (predict) 
         == .02933093 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. Z P>z [    95%   C.I.   ] X 
Tr*  -.0440794 .03019 -1.46 0.144 -.103248   .015089 .647458 
adur*    .0382425 .01883 2.03 0.042 .001331   .075154 .772881 
aup*   -.1565116 .05824 -2.69 0.007 -.270652  -.042372 .613559 
pen*    .0224755 .01819 1.24 0.217 -.013181   .058132 .627119 
pgov*    .0235981 .02297 1.03 0.304 -.021419   .068615 .301695 
attu*    .0451793 .02782 1.62 0.104 -.009345   .099703 .355932 
equ*    .0289397 .01515 1.91 0.056 -.000746   .058625 .874576 
eftr*    .0045183 .01976 0.23 0.819 -.034206   .043243 .138983 
snor*   -.0421507 .02786 -1.51 0.130 -.096746   .012444 .677966 
comc*   -.2309527 .07213 -3.20 0.001 -.37232  -.089586 .644068 
sex*   -.2370887 .1419 -1.67 0.095 -.515213   .041035 .901695 
edu1*    .0778246 .13454 0.58 0.563 -.185877   .341526 .061017 
edu2*    .0939648 .04436 2.12 0.034 .007024   .180906 .508475 
ed3*    .1145444 .08467 1.35 0.176 -.051414   .280503 .186441 
age1*    .2387197 .25565 0.93 0.350 -.262339   .739778 .040678 
age2*    .0183212 .01848 0.99 0.321 -.017895   .054538 .522034 
age3     .0120123 .02439 0.49 0.622 -.035783   .059807 .064407 
tr*  -.0440794 .03019 -1.46 0.144 -.103248   .015089 .647458 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
Table 4.6: Marginal effect result 
4.2.1 Discussion of Results 
a) Tax rate(Tr): As shown in table 4.5, tax rate is found to have statistically significant negative effect on the 
compliance behavior of Category “A”and”B” tax payers in South Gondar zone of the Amhara region. The 
average negative relationship shows the probability that category “A”and”B” tax payers decrease compliance 
behavior with high tax rate. Thus, high tax rate is one of the factors reducing tax compliance behavior in 
districts of South Gondar Zone. The result is consistent with previous findings of Chau and Leung (2009);Alm 
et al. (1995); Aliyu and Gambo (2014). The odds ratio also implies category “A”and”B” tax payers are, on 
average, 0.28 times less likely to be tax compliant for the shift from lower tax rate to relatively higher tax rate. 
The marginal effect presented in table 4.6 show tax compliance behavior decreases by approximately 4% for 
the shift from lower tax rate to higher tax rate category. 
b) Audit rate(adur): uninterrupted auditing is observed to have positive contribution(at 5% and 1% level of 
significance) on tax compliance behavior of category “A”and”B” tax payers in the study area. The result is 
consistent with the theory and most of the findings. The odds ratio show successive auditing would make the 
tax payer approximately 7 times more likely to have compliance behavior than compliance in the absence of 
successive auditing. As table 4.6 also show the shift from less audit rate to uninterrupted auditing increases 
the probability of compliance behavior by around 3.8%. 
c) Audit probability (aup): Table 4.5 also shows the probability of non-detection in tax auditing has negative 
relationship (at 5% and 1% level of significance) with compliance behavior. The result implies an increase in 
the probability of non-detection in tax auditing leads to a decrease in the compliance behavior of category 
“A”and”B” tax payers. The odds ratio result indicates that tax payer with non- detection experience in tax 
auditing is 0.04 times less likely to have compliance behavior. The marginal effect result also confers the same 
idea. The shift of a tax payer idea from successful detection into non-detection in tax auditing reduces the 
compliance probability of category “A”and”B” tax payers by around 15.6%. 
d) Attitude (attu): Attitude is also found as the other statistically significant factor(at both 1% and 5% level of 
significance) positively influencing the tax compliance behavior of category “A”and”B” tax payers in South 
Gondar zone. A tax payer feeling guilty in violation of the tax law is 3.5 times more likely to exhibit 
compliance behavior than the tax payer that doesn’t feel guilty if he/she violates the tax law. As presented in 
table 4.6, the marginal effect of the shift from negative attitude to pay tax to positive attitude is 4% 
improvement to the tax compliance behavior.  
e) Perception of equity of the tax system (equ): tax payer perception about the tax and benefit distribution is 
found to have positive relationship with tax compliance behavior, but only at 10% level of significance. As 
table 4.5 show a tax payer with perception of equity on the tax system is 5.3 times more likely in favor of 
compliance behavior than the tax payer with the perception of inequity. The marginal effect measurement also 
shows the shift from perception of inequitable tax and benefit distribution to perception of equity would 
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improve compliance behavior by around 3%. 
f) Social norm(Snor): The tax compliance behavior of friends, relatives and neighbors do have statistically 
significant( at 10% level of significance) negative effect on the compliance behavior of  category “A”and”B” 
tax payers in South Gondar zone. A tax payer with non-compliant reference is 0.3 times less likely to exhibit 
compliance behavior than those having compliance reference. The marginal effect result also show the shift 
from a reference group with compliance behavior to non- compliance reference group would decrease the 
compliance behavior of category “A”and”B” tax payer by  an average of 4%. 
g) Compliance cost(Comc): Higher compliance cost is found to have statistically significant negative effect on 
the compliance behavior of category “A”and”B” tax payers in South Gondar zone. The odds ratio imply the 
shift from low compliance cost to higher compliance cost leads to approximately 0.02 times less likely to 
exhibit compliance behavior than tax payers with lower compliance cost. On the other hand, the marginal 
effect results again indicate the shift from low compliance cost to higher compliance cost could decrease the 
compliance behavior of the tax payer by approximately 23%. 
h) Sex: Sex of the tax payer is also found as an important determinant of compliance behavior. Being male is 
found to have an average significant negative effect on the compliance  behavior of  category “A”and”B” tax 
payers in South Gondar zone. As indicated in the odds ratio result in table 4.5, being male tax payer is 0.06 
times less likely to have compliance behavior than female tax payer.  The marginal effect result also shows 
the shift from female tax payer to male tax payer would decrease compliance behavior of the tax payer by an 
average of 23.7%. 
i) Education: level of education is found the other important significant determinant of tax compliance behavior 
of category “A”and”B” tax payers in South Gondar zone. Although tax payers without formal education don’t 
have statistically significant difference in terms of compliance behavior relative to primary level completes, 
being in the secondary level of education as well as college and above completed do have statistically 
significant positive difference on the compliance behavior relative to primary level completed. The odds ratio 
result again indicate category “A” and “B” tax payer in the secondary level of education and college and above  
is 14.6 and 7.5 times, respectively, in favor of compliance behavior than primary level completed.  As 
presented in table 4.6, the marginal effect result show the shift from primary level education to secondary 
level and college and above could improve compliance behavior of tax payers by approximately 9%and 11% 
respectively. 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1  Conclusion 
This study is conducted with the objective of identifying the most significant economic, social, fiscal and 
demographic factors determining the tax compliance behavior of category “A” and “B” tax payers in South Gondar 
zone of the Amhara region. Primary data collected from 295 respondents (approximately 87.3% response rate) 
from 11 districts is used. The data is collected by using structured questionnaire after translation is made into the 
local language, Amharic. Both descriptive and econometric analyses are used.  
In order to identify the significant determinants of tax compliance behavior, binary logit model is applied. 
The effect of various determinants on the probability of exhibiting compliance behavior is examined. Finally, the 
study identified: 
 Audit rate, attitude, perception on equity of the tax system and benefit and education are found to 
have statistically significant positive determinants of tax compliance behavior.  
 Tax rate, audit probability, social norm, compliance cost and sex are identified to have statistically 
significant negative effects on tax compliance behavior.  
 Penalty rate, Perception of government Spending, training to enhance tax knowledge and age of the 
respondent are identified to have statistically insignificant effects on compliance behavior of 
category “A” and “B” tax payers in South Gondar zone. 
 
5.2 Recommendation 
Based on the empirical findings, this study would like to forward the following recommendations: 
 As tax rate is in country wide, the tax law should be moderate in relation to tax rate or the government should 
adjust the tax rate because it is not high tax rate that generate income but evasion increases with increasing 
tax rate.  
 The capability to detect fraud or evasion is crucial to taxpayers to be compliant. Therefore, tax authority 
should increase audit probability because evidence of increased compliance is detected as the result of the 
increased probability of an expected audit. 
 It is natural  for people whose  friends pay taxes  to  think  that  the probability of  audit is  high and people 
whose  friends do  not pay  taxes to  think (realize) that the probability of audit is low. Therefore  the tax 
authority should increase the probability of audit and should do more on tax awareness campaigns to the 
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community (taxpayers) about paying tax is right and appropriate. 
 The tax administration and/or authority should simplify the tax process as much as possible to make it easier 
by reducing the compliance costs. Moreover, the E-taxation process and simplification of tax laws should be 
given priorities in ERCA plans. 
 The tax authority should encouraged in relation to uninterrupted auditing because it increases the compliance 
of taxpayers by showing the articles of the law violated and the way forward to avoid future mistakes that will 
be made by taxpayers in his/her books of accounts. Moreover, tax audit means tax education and advice for 
taxpayers. 
 The tax attitude is more depends on the perceived use of the money collected and therefore are connected to 
tax knowledge. Therefore the tax authorities should be continuing in creating tax awareness to fill the tax 
knowledge gap.  
 Tax authorities and officers should be encouraged to treat taxpayers equally in a respectful and responsible 
way, because it will increase trust in the government and thus voluntary tax compliance is likely to increase 
on the individual, group and societal level.  
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